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A PROTECTION MOTIVATION THEORY APPROACH TO
HOME WIRELESS SECURITY
I. M. Y. Woon, G. W. Tan, and R. T. Low
School of Computing





Research in socio-technical factors in computer security has traditionally focused on employees and their work
practice within the premises of the organization.  However, with universal access to computing and the diverse
means of connecting such devices to each another and to the global Internet, work carried out has shifted
outside one central physical location to encompass a variety of possible points-of-access that include homes,
modern cafés, and public libraries.  Given the ubiquity of wireless devices used for last-hop access to the
Internet from home, we look at the security of home wireless networks.  In this work, we identify the variables
that affect the decision of home wireless network users to implement security features on their networks.  Our
study is based on the protection motivation theory.  A survey was conducted on 189 home users to identify and
characterize predictors that differentiate between users who secure their home wireless networks and those
who don’t.  Results of the analysis identified the following variables as significant:  perceived severity, response
efficacy, self efficacy, and response cost.
Keywords:  Protection motivation theory, wireless security, computer security, logistic regression analysis
Introduction
Research in socio-technical factors in computer security has traditionally focused on employees and their work practice within
the premises of the organization (Dhillion and Torkzadeh 2001; Galletta and Polak 2003; Siponen 2000).  However, universal
access to computing and the diverse means of connecting such devices to each another and to the global Internet has significantly
altered the location-based work paradigm.  To examine its impact on information security, we consider two sets of users:
(1) organizational employees who use the organization’s computer network resources, and (2) the academic researcher and his
students.  In each case, work carried out has shifted outside one central physical location to encompass a variety of possible points-
of-access that include homes, modern cafés, public libraries, and even modes of transport such as trains.  This means that prior
assumptions about information security valid under the old model of work pattern may no longer be tenable.  Newer work
practices and environments where work is carried out may have introduced newer threats or weaknesses, or invalidated prior
assumptions for security.  Therefore, these newer environments should be reevaluated for information security strengths and
weaknesses.  This may result in newer security policies needed to realize the same level of security.  However, because of the
breadth and scope of the study needed to answer this question in sufficient depth, we focus in this paper on one significant aspect
of the newer environment, namely the last-hop wireless access from the home.
The demarcation between work at-work and work at-home is rapidly and increasingly dissolving.  Organizations increasingly offer
employees the ability to work from home, and large organizations frequently have project members that live in different geo-
graphic areas.  Furthermore, as time-to-market has become critical, employees are encouraged to work from home.  In this new
work model, home is at least as important a location as the office where work happens.  A similar situation exists in the academic
world, in disciplines such as mathematics and information systems.  Researchers in these disciplines do not need to conduct
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physical experiments that require their physical presence to manipulate equipment or carry out experiments.  Instead, the software
applications that they use can easily be installed on notebooks and desktops.  Indeed, the favored work pattern of these academic
researchers is to work from notebooks that give them the portability to easily carry their work between office and home.  This
convenience is further increased by the ubiquitous access to computing devices connected by wireless networks.  This facilitates
access, but at the same time adds additional “links” to the chain of access to data and computing.
With the premise of ubiquitous wireless access in every walk of life, it then becomes important to study how well employees,
academic researchers, and students protect computing systems at home that they use directly or indirectly for their work or to
access their parent organization’s network and data repositories.  If the premise that “security is as strong as its weakest link” is
accepted, then we argue that modern work patterns have (likely) shifted the weakest link to an amorphous periphery that at least
includes employee’s, researcher’s, or student’s homes.  Now we consider how these people at home connect to the organization’s
network and where insecurity can be introduced.
A U.S. Census Bureau survey (2000) show that 41 percent of households have Internet access.  Broadband internet access in the
home and the use of wireless local area networks (WLANs) to share home broadband Internet connections skyrocketed in 2004
and are expected to triple in the next 5 years (Ipsos Insight 2005).  The popularity of wireless networks at home can be explained
in terms of its convenience and flexibility.  Unlike wired networks, wireless networks use radio signals to communicate.  This
allows users easy as well as multiple access to the Internet from anywhere in their home, and to share files and resources like
printers.  However, because radio signals travel outside the user’s network, other wireless devices can pick up unprotected signals
and either connect to the user’s network (uninvited) or capture information being sent across it (i.e., sniff data such as e-mail
messages, passwords, user names, etc.).  Using this information, a hacker may be able to access and modify the user’s data, access
the user’s organizational resources, hijack the home-user’s wireless network, or remotely control the unprotected home computer
to attack critical infrastructures (Office of Homeland Security 2002).  The CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey (Gordon
et al. 2004) reports that damages arising from abuse of wireless networks alone amounted to USD10 million in 2004.  The
recommendations given to minimize security risks in wireless networks include restricting access, encrypting data, and protecting
the service set identifier (SSID) (McDowell et al. 2005).  Although the dangers from wireless hacking are well documented
(Arbaugh et al. 2002; Thomas 2004), several studies have shown that many users of WLANs make no effort to enable security
measures on their networks (Mimoso 2003; Poulsen 2001).
Given the ubiquity of wireless devices used for last-hop access to the Internet, we tackle the following slice of the overall problem.
We attempt to discover those cognitive factors that differentiate between people who secure their wireless access devices from
those who do not make such efforts.  The results of the study can then be used to devise measures that ameliorate the danger of
using unprotected wireless access.  The factors considered in this study are proposed by the protection motivation theory (Rippetoe
and Rogers 1987; Rogers 1975, 1983).  This theory has been used extensively for successfully predicting behavior in the fields
of health (Hall et al. 2004; Kanvil and Umeh 2000;  Searle et  al. 2000) and social research (Allen 1993; Axelrod and Newton
1991; Campis et al. 1989).
Theoretical Background
The protection motivation theory (PMT) measures the coping behavior of a person when he/she is informed of a threatening event
(e.g., cigarette smoking is linked to lung cancer) (Rippetoe and Rogers 1987).  This behavior is directly influenced by the coping
response which refers to a person’s willingness to perform a recommended behavior (this could be to quit smoking totally, reduce
the number of cigarettes per day, etc.).  The coping response is the net result of the person’s evaluation of the threat appraisal and
coping appraisal.
Threat appraisal refers to a person’s assessment of the level of danger posed by the threat.  It consists of perceived vulnerability
(the person’s assessment of the probability of the threatening event), perceived severity (the severity of the consequences of the
event), and rewards (intrinsic and extrinsic rewards of not adopting a recommended coping response).  For example, the rewards
for continued smoking (i.e., not stopping smoking) are psychological pleasure and peer approval (Prentice-Dunn and McClendon
2001).
The second cognitive process, coping appraisal, refers to the person’s assessment of his ability to cope with and avert the potential
loss or damage resulting from the danger.  It consists of self efficacy (the person’s confidence in his/her own ability to perform
the recommended behavior), response efficacy (the efficacy of the recommended behavior), and response cost (the perceived
opportunity costs—monetary, time, effort—in adopting the recommended behavior).  In the smoking example, self efficacy refers
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to the person’s confidence in his/her ability to quit smoking, response efficacy to the health benefits of not smoking, and response
cost to the withdrawal symptoms that the smoker suffers when he/she stops smoking.
Research Model
We adapt our research model (see Figure 1) from the 1987 version of PMT in two ways.  The first is that as we are doing a cross
sectional rather than a longitudinal study; we do not investigate the coping response construct (i.e., the person’s intention to adopt
a recommended behavior).  We consider only behavior and model it as a binary variable distinguishing between home users who
have enabled security features and those who have not.  Regarding the rewards construct, we find that the person does not derive
any intrinsic pleasure nor extrinsic approval for not enabling security features.  Hence this construct was not included in the
model.
Recommended Behavior 
Behavior refers to the person’s actual response to a recommended behavior and is the net effect of threat appraisal and coping
appraisal.  In this study, the recommended behavior is to enable the security features on the home wireless network.
Threat Appraisal
The two components of this construct are perceived vulnerability and perceived severity.
Perceived vulnerability refers to a person’s assessment of his/her own probability of being exposed to a threat (Rogers 1983).
In this study, threat refers to unauthorized access to the user’s wireless networks.  Many studies (Rippetoe and Rogers 1987;
Wurtele 1988; Wurtele and Maddux, 1987) have shown a significant main effect of perceived vulnerability on coping response,
with people who exhibit high levels also showing increased intention to adopt a recommended coping response.  Thus we
hypothesize that
H1: Perceived vulnerability will be significant in determining if a respondent running a home wireless network
will enable security measures.
Perceived severity measures the magnitude of the consequences to an individual if the threat succeeds (Milne et al. 2000).  In this
context, loss of personal information and online identity are considered as possible consequences.  Previous health related studies
(Maddux and Rogers 1983; Milne et al. 2000) found severity to be the least significant of the four cognitive mediating factors.
Figure 1.  Research Model
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On the other hand, best practices in IT security management advocate a risk assessment approach to managing security risks
(ISO/IEC 1998; Stoneburner et al. 2002).  According to this approach, action to reduce the level of risk should be taken when they
(risks) become unacceptably high.  Since risk levels will increase when the severity of the loss from a threat increases, we
hypothesize that
H2: Perceived severity will be significant in determining if a respondent running a home wireless network will
enable security measures.
Coping Appraisal
The three components in this construct are response efficacy, self efficacy, and response cost.
Response efficacy is defined as the belief that a recommended coping response will be effective in protecting the self or others
from a threat.  Guidelines from cyber-security experts such as US-CERT (McDowell et al. 2005) advocate that home users take
measures such as filtering media access control addresses, changing the default service set identifier, and enabling encryption on
WLANs to secure home wireless networks.  Past studies have shown positive correlation between response efficacy and coping
response ranging from significant (Maddux and Stanley 1986) to medium (Wurtele 1988) effects.  Thus we hypothesize that
H3: Response efficacy will be significant in determining if a respondent running a home wireless network will
enable security measures.
Self efficacy is defined as the expectancy of a person’s capability in performing a recommended coping behavior (i.e., enabling
the security features in this case).  In studies based on self efficacy theory (Bandura 1977), self efficacy has been found to have
a significant positive correlation on behavioral change (Bandura et al. 1980; Condiotte and Lichtenstein 1981).  In addition,
significant correlations between self efficacy and coping response have also been found in a wide range of PMT related studies
(Fruin et al. 1991; Maddux and Rogers 1983; Maddux and Stanley 1986).  A quantitative study by Milne et al. (2000) has also
shown that among all PMT independent variables, self efficacy has the most robust effect on intention.  Hence, we hypothesize
that
H4: Self efficacy will be significant in determining if a respondent running a home wireless network will enable
security measures.
Response costs are the costs perceived by an individual in performing a recommended coping behavior and may include monetary
expense, inconvenience, difficulty, and the side effects of performing the coping behavior.  Support for the link between response
cost and coping response is given by Helmes (2002) and Neuwirth et al. (2000).  Response cost in our case translates to slower
response costs due to encryption overhead and the inconvenience of changing the encryption key regularly.  Therefore, we
hypothesize that
H5: Response cost will be significant in determining if a respondent running a home wireless network will
enable security measures.
Research Methodology
The model was tested using survey methodology to improve the generalizability of results (Dooley 2001).  First a draft instrument
was constructed by adapting scales from previous literature to measure the constructs.  The instrument was pretested with three
experts in computer security to ensure its content validity.  An interview was conducted with each expert and changes suggested
by the expert were reflected in the instrument, which was then used for the next interview, according to the procedure in Straub
(1989).  Items were added, reworded, and deleted in this pretest.  To assess the construct validity of the various scales and to
identify any ambiguous items, judges were asked to sort the various items into construct categories according to the procedure
in Moore and Benbasat (1991).  A total of two sorting rounds were conducted until items were stable and a high item placement
ratio and acceptable Cohen’s kappa (> 0.65) was achieved.  This resulted in a 31-item questionnaire.
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Table 1.  Demographic and Knowledge Profile of Respondents
Descriptor Percentage Descriptor Percentage
Gender
• Male 60%     
• Female 40%     
Security Feature Enabled
• Yes 60%     
• No 40%     
Profession
• Academic 55%     
• Industry 45%     
Knowledge Quiz Scores
• High knowledge 39.2%   
• Low knowledge 60.8%   
Data Collection
Besides the 31-item survey instrument, we also administered a 7-item knowledge quiz.  This quiz gave us an objective indication
of the respondent’s knowledge of the domain, which we used to validate the perceptual measures on self efficacy.
The questionnaire and a 7-item knowledge quiz was administered to the respondents at a large university.  We checked the
respondents for the ownership of home wireless networks by asking them for the brand of their wireless router.  Of these
respondents, 45 percent are full-time employees who were pursuing part-time postgraduate diplomas or degrees as well as those
pursuing continuing courses; 55 percent of the respondents were academic researchers who are employees of the university as
well as students at the same institution.  The survey consists of three sections:  a demographic section, the main research
instrument, and a knowledge quiz.  To encourage participation in the survey, a small monetary incentive was provided to all
respondents.  All questionnaire items were measured using a seven-point Likert scale.  A total of 215 responses were collected.
Univariate outlier analysis reduced the sample size by 26, leaving a final sample of 189 sets of data for analysis.  The profile of
the survey respondents is shown in Table 1.
Knowledge Quiz
Knowledge has been used in a variety of studies to measure a respondent’s awareness regarding a given subject matter, and its
subsequent effect on preventive or risky behavior (Lukwago et al. 2003; Nyamathi et al. 1993).  In this study, the respondent’s
knowledge of network security and specific actions to take to defend the wireless network was measured by a seven-item quiz
designed with the help of two professors who taught computer security to undergraduates in the Computer Science Department.
Cluster analysis was used to distinguish between the levels of knowledge of the respondents.  The results showed that the low-
knowledge group had a mean score of 1.67 out of a maximum of 7 while the high-knowledge group had a mean score of 5.2.
Data Analysis and Results
Reliability and Validity
With the data gathered, the individual constructs were tested for reliability, convergent, and discriminant validity.  Reliability was
tested using Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach 1951).  Nunnally (1978) suggested that the reliability of the constructs be above 0.70
but also mentioned that reliabilities of 0.50 to 0.60 would suffice in early stages of research.  Hence, for this study, reliability
scores of more than 0.50 were considered acceptable.
Subsequently, the items were tested for validity using factor analysis with principal components analysis and varimax rotation.
Convergent validity was assessed by checking loadings to see if items for the same construct correlate highly among  themselves.
Discriminant validity was assessed by examining the factor loadings to see if items loaded more highly on their intended
constructs than on other constructs (Cook and Campbell 1979).  Loadings of 0.45 to 0.54 are considered fair, 0.55 to 0.62 good,
0.63 to 0.70 very good, and above 0.71 excellent (Comrey 1973).
Next, reliability analysis was combined with discriminant and convergent validity analysis to eliminate items that had (1) low
item-item and item-scale correlation (< 0.5), (2) increased alpha if deleted, or (3) cross-loaded onto more than one factor.  This
process resulted in the elimination of 7 items.  However, before these items were eliminated, checks were made to ensure that
content validity of constructs was not compromised.  The refined items are given in Table 2.
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• I could be subjected to a malicious wireless hacking attempt (PerVul1)
• I feel that I could be vulnerable to wireless hacking (PerVul2)
Cox et al. 2004;
Milne et al. 2002
Perceived
Severity
• Having my online identity stolen as a result of wireless hacking is a serious
problem for me (PerSer1)
• E-mail eavesdropping resulting from wireless hacking is a serious problem for
me (PerSer2)
• Losing data privacy as a result of wireless hacking is a serious problem for me
(PerSer3)
• Loss resulting from wireless hacking is not a serious problem for me (PerSer4)
Cox et al. 2004;
Milne et al. 2000;
Milne et al. 2002
Response
Efficacy
• Enabling security measures on my home wireless network will prevent hackers
from stealing network bandwidth (ResEff1)
• Enabling the security measures on a home wireless network is an effective way
of deterring hacker attacks (ResEff2)
• Enabling security measures on my home wireless network will prevent hackers
from gaining important personal or financial information (ResEff3)
• Enabling security measures on my home wireless network will prevent hackers
from stealing my identity (ResEff4)
Self Developed
Self efficacy • It would be easy for me to enable security features on the home wireless network
by myself (SelfEff1)
• I could enable wireless security measures if there was no-one around to tell me
what to do as I go along (SelfEff2)






• The cost of enabling security measures decreases the convenience afforded by a
home wireless network (ResCost1)
• There are too many overheads associated with trying to enable security measures
on a home wireless network (ResCost2)
• Enabling security features on my wireless router would require considerable
investment of effort other than time (ResCost3)
• Enabling security features on a wireless router would be time consuming
(ResCost4)
Fruin et al. 1991;
Milne et al. 2002;
Tanner et al. 1991
Table 3.  Reliability of Constructs
Construct No of Items Cronbach Alpha
Perceived Vulnerability (PerVul) 2 0.67
Perceived Severity (PerSer) 4 0.80
Response Efficacy (ResEff) 4 0.84
Self efficacy (SelfEff) 3 0.82
Response Cost (ResCost) 4 0.74
The reliability values for the final instrument is given in Table 3 and all constructs exceeded the minimum acceptable value of
0.5.  
Factor analysis of the final instrument yielded five components with eigenvalues above 1 (see Table 4).  All questions had at least
good loadings on their intended constructs.  These five components explained 66.88 percent of total cumulative variance and give
an indication of the low level of collinearity between the independent variables of our study, since all items load cleanly into their
respective construct categories.
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Table 4.  Validity of Constructs
Component
1 2 3 4 5
PerVul1 .11 .14 .19 .05 .79
PerVul2 .16 .03 .08 -.07 .85
PerSer1 -.03 .78 .02 .00 -.04
PerSer2 .13 .76 .13 .03 .04
PerSer3 .11 .75 .06 -.02 .23
PerSer4 .21 .81 -.03 .00 .02
ResEff1 .76 .04 -.03 .12 .23
ResEff2 .79 .04 .20 .06 .05
ResEff3 .85 .13 .01 -.00 .07
ResEff4 .81 .19 .00 -.01 .01
SelfEff1 .01 .06 .84 -.20 .23
SelfEff2 .15 .12 .78 .01 -.02
SelfEff3 .00 -.01 .85 -.19 .14
ResCost1 -.15 .07 .14 .73 .09
ResCost2 .03 .01 -.10 .82 .08
ResCost3 .18 .03 -.27 .71 -.13
ResCost4 .12 -.08 -.18 .67 -.10
Eigenvalues 3.74 2.83 1.98 1.67 1.13
Variance 22.00 16.68 11.67 9.83 6.69
Cumulative Variance 22.00 38.68 50.36 60.19 66.88
Testing the Relationships
The relationships given in the research model (Figure 1) are tested using logistic regression.  The independent variables are
perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, response efficacy, response cost ,and self efficacy.  As each individual variable consists
of multiple items, a summated scored across the items is taken as the score for that variable.  The dependent variable is behavior
which is a binary measure of yes/no depending on whether security features are enabled.
Logistic Regression
Regression is a statistical analysis method whereby the independent variables in a regression model are able to distinguish between
pairs of groups (Hair et al. 1998).  Although discriminant analysis can also be used for this study, logistic regression has several
advantages.  First, logistic regression does not rely on the strict assumptions of multivariate normality and equal variance,
assumptions that are not met in many real life situations (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989).  Second, logistic regression is preferred
because of its similarity to regression, with the ability to incorporate nonlinear effects and a wide range of diagnostics functions,
including variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance diagnostics (Neter et al. 1996).  Finally, logistic regression does not require
the dependent variable to be normally distributed, the most important reason for choosing logistic regression as our analysis tool.
We also fulfill the recommended level of 10 sets of data per independent variable (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989) for Logistic
Regression analysis.
To obtain reliable results from the logistic regression analysis, independent constructs must not be multicollinear, meaning two
or more independent constructs should not have a high level of correlation with each other (Hair et al. 1998).  A definitive
indication of multicollinearity can be drawn from the VIF, with VIF values ranging from 1 to 1.8 being indicative of non-
multicollearity (Gammie et al. 2003).  As all the independent variables in our model have VIF values within the accepted range
(see Table 5) they are not multicollinear.
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Table 5.  Collinearity Statistics for All Independent Variables
Variables t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Perceived Vulnerability .30 .77 .95 1.05
Perceived Severity 2.52 .01 .91 1.10
Response Efficacy 2.44 .02 .91 1.09
Self Efficacy 3.18 .00 .88 1.14
Response Cost -2.95 .00 .87 1.15
Table 6.  Model Fitting Information
Model -2 Log Likelihood O² df Sig.
Final 209.55 42.58 5 .00
Table 7.  Parameter Estimates 
Behavior B
Std







.01 .06 .05 1 .82 1.01 209.61 .05
Perceived Severity * .11 .04 6.27 1 .01 1.12 216.02 6.46
Response Efficacy * .12 .05 5.66 1 .02 1.13 215.59 6.03
Self efficacy * .17 .06 8.82 1 .00 1.19 218.96 9.41
Response Cost * -.14 .05 8.34 1 .00 .87 218.71 9.16
Reference Category = Enabled Group, * p < 0.05
The presence of an overall relationship between the dependent variable and combination of the independent variables is based
on the statistical significance of the final model P² in the SPSS table named “Model Fitting Information.”  The probability of the
model P² (42.58) is 0.00 (see Table 6), less than or equal to the level of significance of 0.05.  While the model P² assesses the
overall logistic model, it does not tell us if particular independent variables are more important than others.  This can be done by
looking at the information on the parameter estimates given in Table 7.  All relationships between the independent variables except
perceived vulnerability and behavior are significant.
Exp(B) is the odds ratio that assesses the risk of a particular outcome.  In this study, it shows the likelihood of a respondent who
has not secured his home wireless network, securing it.  The table shows that self efficacy has the highest odds (1.19-1 = 19%)
versus response cost (1-.87 = 13%) response efficacy (1.13-1 = 13%), and perceived severity (1.12-1 = 12%) of a respondent who
has not secured his home wireless network doing it.  This can be interpreted to mean that we may be able to get a user to secure
his networks if we are able to promote the user’s self efficacy or convince the user of effectiveness of the security measures or
reduce the response cost of the security measures.  Note that response cost has a negative relationship with behavior as reducing
the response cost will increase the likelihood of the respondent performing the recommended behavior.







Enabled 95 21 81.9%
Not Enabled 35 38 52.1%
Overall Percentage 68.8% 31.2% 70.4%





Not Enabled 73 38.6%
Valid 178 100.0%
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Table 10.  Summary of Findings
Hypothesis Significance Result
Perceived vulnerability will be significant in determining if a respondent running a home
wireless network will enable security measures
.82 Not
Supported
Perceived severity will be significant in determining if a respondent running a home
wireless network will enable security measures
.01 Supported
Response efficacy will be significant in determining if a respondent running a home
wireless network will enable security measures
.02 Supported
Self efficacy will be significant in determining if a respondent running a home wireless
network will enable security measures
.00 Supported
Response cost will be significant in determining if a respondent running a home wireless
network will enable security measures
.00 Supported
To accurately assess the utility of the regression model, we compare predicted group membership (see Table 8) to known
membership (see Table 9).  To determine if our model is useful in prediction, the classification percentage of 70.4 percent (see
Table 8) has to exceed the chance accuracy rate by 25 percent (Hand et al. 2001).  The chance accuracy rate is calculated by
summing the squared value of the proportion of each case in the dependent variable (see Table 9), then multiplying that value by
1.25.  Since the minimum model acceptance rate is calculated to be 0.65 ((0.6142 + 0.3862) * 1.25), which is less than 70.4 percent,
the classification accuracy criterion for this regression model is accepted.
Conclusions from the logistic regression are summarized in Table 10, showing that all of the proposed hypotheses except H1 are
supported
Discussion and Findings
This section discusses the observations and key findings with respect to the hypotheses of this study and suggests possible
implications that the results of this study have in theory and practice.  The regression model had classification rates that are higher
than its respective proportion by chance accurate rates, indicating an acceptable level of predictive power for the model at 70.4
percent.  Analysis also shows that four out of the five proposed hypotheses were supported.  Our findings did not support our
hypothesis that perceived vulnerability would be a significant predictor of behavior (H1).  This is similar to the finding by
Plotnikoff and Higginbotham (2002), who attribute the lack of positive association to substantial differences in which a person
perceives different health threats.  This explanation may also be used to explain the situation here.  Although the media,
mainstream newspapers, and publications report security breaches, they usually do not specifically highlight if these breaches arise
from the use of undefended wireless networks.  In contrast, virus attacks feature prominently in the news.  Taken together with
the results of the other independent variables, we can also explain that a person who feels vulnerable may not take action to avert
the danger as he does not feel he is able to do it (self efficacy).
All of the other four independent variables were found to have significance in influencing the decision to enable security features.
Table 11 shows the effect sizes of each of these variables using Cohen’s d statistic (Cohen 1988).  It is generally accepted that
0.2 constitutes a small effect size, 0.5 is considered moderate, and 0.8 is considered as a large effect size.  The magnitude of the
effect sizes indicates that the people who have not enabled security wireless tend to have greatest concern about self efficacy
(effect size = 26.9).
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Cluster Number of 
Cases
Low Knowledge 60 15 41 116
High Knowledge 13 47 13 73
Total 73 62 54 189
Self efficacy was found to be a statistically significant predictor (H4); findings are consistent with those of several previous studies
(Fruin et al. 1991; Maddux and Rogers 1983; Maddux and Stanley 1986).  We expected that self efficacy would be linked to a
respondent’s knowledge and this was confirmed by the results of the Spearman correlation analysis, which showed that the
correlation between self efficacy and knowledge is good and significant (r = 0.58, p = 0.00).  A further analysis into this link was
performed by a considering each respondent’s answer as to whether he/she enabled the security features themselves.  From
Table 12, we see that those who secure their wireless networks on their own (“own enabled” group) possess higher levels of
knowledge compared to those who had others secure it for them (“others enabled” group).  Although the “others enabled” group
do not have required knowledge, they are motivated enough to get others to do the job for them.
Response efficacy was found to be a statistically significant predictor (H3); findings are consistent with those of several previous
studies (Maddux and Stanley 1986; Wurtele 1988).  Similar to studies by Neuwirth et al. (2000) and Helmes (2002), response
cost (H5) was also found as a significant predictor of behavior.  However, unlike existing studies in the health domain (Maddux
and Rogers 1983; Milne et al. 2000), perceived severity (H2) was found to be a significant predictor.  A possible explanation could
be that the severity of health threats differs according to the genetic makeup of the person or other personal characteristics such
as age or occupation (e.g., alcohol abuse may be more detrimental to a person who has a liver problem).  However, in computer
security, the impact is more uniform.
In our questionnaire, respondents who did not enable the security features were directed to answer two questions regarding their
intention:
1. I intend to take some form of precaution against wireless hacking.
2. I intend to do nothing as I am unlikely to be a target of wireless hacking attempts.
Based on these two questions, K-means clustering was used to divide the “not enabled” group into two clusters.  There were 23
respondents in the first cluster and 50 in the second cluster.  Pearson correlation analysis (see Table 13) of these two groups and
the group who had others enable the security features on their home wireless yielded more insights.
Table 13.  Correlations of Three Subgroups
Intend to Do Nothing
(N = 23)
























*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level
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Respondents who intend to do nothing may be persuaded otherwise if they can perceive that the impact of wireless security
breaches may affect them indirectly and not just directly or if they can be convinced that enabling the security features will protect
them.  Respondents who have had other people enable their security settings for them are those who recognize the threat but do
not feel comfortable doing the job themselves, as seen from the self efficacy correlation.  This explanation is also consistent with
the result shown by the response efficacy correlation.  Since these respondents have low levels of knowledge, they do not know
if the recommended measures will be effective.  Thus for this group of people, specific step-by-step instructions and their rationale
issued by CERT teams may be beneficial.  Since response cost is negatively related to behavior (see Table 7), the response cost
correlation is interpreted as the group intending to take precaution will do so if response cost is reduced; a commonly held opinion
by most end-users is that security should be as transparent as possible.  Self efficacy is also a barrier to enabling security settings
for this group, as seen by the negative correlation.
In summary, the results of our research are somewhat consistent with the findings of previous studies (Cox et al. 2004; Wurtele
1988; Wurtele and Maddux 1987) that found significant main effects for coping appraisal but not threat appraisal variables.  We
determine that educating home wireless network users about the vulnerability that they are exposed to from wireless hacking may
not be the most effective way of getting them to secure their networks.  However, we establish that perceived severity has a
significant effect on behavior.  This means that although they do not think that they are likely targets, overall they perceive that
the impact of a security breach would have a detrimental impact on them (e.g., slow response from the Internet).
For the factors that we found significant, we conducted a more in-depth analysis by clustering the “enabled” group into the “own
enabled” the “others enabled” group and the “not enabled” group into “intend to do nothing” group and “intend to take some
precaution” group.  This finer level of analysis produced interesting findings and implications for practitioners.  Although different
groups of users have different concerns that have to be addressed differently, the findings suggest that self efficacy is a common
factor that needs to be addressed.  Self efficacy is usually promoted through education and training programs but as these are home
users, a more effective way would be to deliver customized installation material at the point of sale or possibly to refer users to
websites that give a step-by-step installation procedure.  Currently, the user guides given are daunting to a novice as they are
comprehensive and cover all platforms and possibilities of connection.  In addition, CERT worldwide could host training sites
that show the users what to do and why they should do it.  Response efficacy, which is the concern of those in the “others enabled”
group, could be addressed this way as well.  Finally, it would appear that users who “intend to take precautions” feel that time
and effort to secure their networks is challenging.  This suggests that manufacturers would have to automate the set-up procedures
further or provide more intuitive interfaces to the set-up programs.  
Limitations and Implications for Research
This study explored the cognitive psychological factors that influence the decision of home wireless network users to implement
security features on their wireless networks.  We adapted our research model from the protection motivation theory and examined
prior research in order to formulate a research instrument that allowed us to measure perceived vulnerability, perceived severity,
self efficacy, response efficacy, and response cost.  We built and analyzed the regression model from the data collected from a
survey of 189 home users.  This number represents only a small fraction of the total number of home users.  As such, the results
and findings from this research would need to be validated by enlarging the sample size.  In particular, we would need to ensure
that we have an equal number of samples from each set of users (employees and researchers) and that the composition of the
samples in each subgroups (“others enabled,” “intend to do nothing,” “intend to take precaution”) is uniformly distributed.
Although our PMT-based model is largely successful in predicting behavior, further research could examine other factors to
increase its explanatory power.  Of particular interest would be organizational security policies regarding access from out-of-office
and the respondent’s general computer security attitude (e.g., whether he installs anti-virus protection or a firewall on his home
computer).  Another avenue of exploration would be to include situational factors such as existing legal sanctions and the home
user’s past experiences with security breaches.
Conclusion
This research is a preliminary effort to examine the phenomena of employees and researchers working out-of-the office, accessing
organizational networks and resources, and the impact on security.  In particular, we focused on the security of wireless access
from home.  We use the protection motivation theory as our theoretical base as it is intuitively appealing and has been successfully
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applied to health threats.  As part of the empirical validation of PMT, a survey instrument was developed to measure the
independent predictors of behavior.  The final instrument was used to collect responses from different sets of home users.  We
applied logistic regression analysis to the data as the dependent variable is dichotomous.  We found that, overall, self efficacy,
response efficacy, response costs, and perceived severity were the most significant predictors of a user’s behavior.  Our regression
model had a hit ratio of 70.4 percent.  Our research also yielded unexpected results, finding perceived severity to be significant
in predicting behavior, a finding that is inconsistent with health-related studies.  This validates risk management guidelines
suggested by best practices in IT security management.  Implications for practitioners include the need to make security know-how
easier, more accessible, and more transparent to the user.  Implications for research focus on how the model can be further
validated and extended.
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